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what they think they are doing—they are trying to accomplish ends which are in themselves contradictory and null. In general this play may be called the comedy of the Imagination as against the Reason, or of the abstract Ideal as against the Actual, wherein the Imagination in pursuing an object is at the same time destroying it. Its content thus reaches deep into the history of the world. All visionary commonwealths, Plato's Republic, More's Utopia, Harrington's Oceana, Arcadias, Icarias, Atlantises, etc.; also, many of the so-called ideal lives, paradisiacal societies; in fine, the whole consciousness upon which such bodiless creations of fancy repose,—constitute the theme of this drama and are exhibited in their finitude.

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

In the last number of this journal we introduced correspondence and discussion on the subject of proofs of immortality. We postpone until some future number a continuation of the discussion in order to make room for the following interesting matter.

EDITOR.

### *The Causal Nexus.*

[The following very able treatment of the psychological question involved in the subject of causality we have received from Dr. Brinton.—Ed.]

#### AXIOM.

A cognition can only be known by a difference between itself and a related cognition.

#### SIGNS.

$A B$  = a simple sequence, causal or not.

$A \therefore B$  =  $A$  is the cause of  $B$ .

—  $A \therefore B$  =  $A$  is *not* the cause of  $B$ .

## PROPOSITIONS.

### THEOREM I.

In a simple sequence, without other cognitions, no causal idea can arise.

Let  $A B$  be a simple sequence, without other cognitions. Be it supposed, first, that  $D \therefore B$ ; hence —  $A \therefore B$ . But the cognition of this relation cannot arise, as (*per axioma*) it requires the cognition  $D$ , and, *ex hypothesi*,  $D$  is unknown. Be it supposed, secondly,  $A \therefore B$ ; but, as (*per axioma*) this cognition can only be known by the cognition that any —  $D \therefore B$ , and, *ex hypothesi*, this is unknown; hence, neither the idea  $A \therefore B$ , nor —  $A \therefore B$ , can arise.

## THEOREM II.

In a simple sequence the relation of each factor to a third gives the causal idea.

Let  $AB$  be a simple sequence in which  $D \therefore B$ . Then that  $\neg A \therefore B$  can be known only by reference to  $D$  (*Prop. I.*) For as a simple sequence no causal idea can arise; but it is given; hence it must be by reference to this third cognition. And it must have a relation to each factor. For unless  $A$  is known in relation to  $B$  and  $D$ , then the causal sequence  $D \therefore B$  is also unknown (*per Prop. I.*) Secondly, suppose  $A \therefore B$ . But in the simple sequence  $AB$  this cannot be known (*Prop. I.*) But it is given; hence it must be in relation to  $D$ . ( $A \therefore B$  and  $\neg A \therefore D$ ).

## THEOREM III.

The relation of the third factor to a simple sequence is that of positive and negative.

Let  $AB$  be a simple sequence in which  $D \therefore B$ . Then  $\neg D \therefore A$ . For if  $D \therefore A$  also, then the difference in the cognitions  $AB$  disappears and they are not known (*per axioma*). But *ex hypothesi* they are known. Hence the relation must exist as  $\neg D \therefore A$ . *Q. E. D.*

*Corollary.*—In a simple sequence, with causal factors completed, the relations are  $D \therefore B$ ,  $\neg D \therefore A$ ,  $C \therefore A$ ,  $\neg C \therefore B$ .

## THEOREM IV.

The relation of the third factor of a simple sequence to its positive is that of a general to a particular.

In the simple sequence  $AB$  where  $D \therefore B$ , it is also implied  $\neg D \therefore A$  (*per Prop. III.*); so in any other sequence  $FB$  it is also true  $\neg D \therefore F$ ; and in any such sequence  $D \therefore B$ , or the cognition becomes impossible. In all sequences  $FB$ ,  $B$  is only known causally by these relations,  $D \therefore B$  and  $\neg D \therefore F$ , in which  $D$  is the positive invariable and  $F$  the negative variable.\* But this relation of  $B$  to  $D$  is that of a particular to a general. Hence, &c.

From this we see that the “idea of cause,” so called, is neither a mere repetition of sequences (according to Hume, Mill, Bain, &c.); nor a mysterious unknowable (Spencer, &c.); but an effort at generalization, or the forming of concepts, obscured by its expression between sequents only.

Philadelphia, Sept. 1, 1873.

D. G. BRINTON.

[In a subsequent letter Dr. B. makes some remarks illustrative of the scope of the above demonstration, which we here quote:

“The line of illustration which could be adopted in giving a concrete exposition of these propositions would be three-fold. *First*, their correspondence to the physiological character of semi-perception, the latter being unable to rise to a subject for intellection unless two such perceptions stand in relation to a third of a different class.

“*Secondly*, the mathematical expression of the second law of thought, as determined by Professor Boole, being  $x^2 = x$ , or, more definitely,

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\* That is,  $D$  is the positive invariable *antecedent* and  $F$  the negative variable *antecedent*.—EDITOR.

$x(1-x)=0$ , we see that it also assumes the necessity of three factors to any thought at all.

"*Thirdly*, the practical application of this formal law in the Dialectical method not only illustrates the general view, but, by developing the positive value of the privative expressed by Prof. Boole as  $1-x$ , and in my formula as  $\neg D \therefore A$ , leads to the only real speculative knowledge possible to us on transcendental subjects.

"This latter position might be historically exhibited by showing that upon it rests the theories of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, that contained in the Bhagavat Gita, and, later, those of Spinoza, Hegel, and Gioberti. On the ascertaining of the exact or even the approximate value of  $1-x$  as a positive cognition must finally rest the whole superstructure of both religious and metaphysical thought; and the denial that it has a positive value at all by such writers as Prof. Boole and Prof. Thompson (of Oxford), is to me inexplicable. Certainly they could not have considered where it would lead them. I am not prepared to say we can assign formal laws for its development; but we can and must assign it a positive value within fixed limits. I believe an exhaustive analysis of it by the logical calculus would be the best answer to those who deny the validity of speculative thought; and would also warn speculative thinkers where those "limits of thought" are, about which of recent years there has been a good deal of indefinite and aimless discussion."

Pursuing the line of thought indicated in the above propositions, we might add, by way of illustrating the same from the stand-point taken hitherto in this journal, the following:

I. The simplest form of cognition knows things as isolated and independent, without mutual relation.

II. The next higher form of cognition is REFLECTION. It knows things as particularized and characterized or differentiated by properties, marks, characteristics, or attributes. These latter, it perceives are in every instance, forms of relation to other things. Instead of independent things, Reflection therefore posits interdependent things. No one thing is a total, but its relation connects it with an outlying sphere of things, with which it forms a transcending totality (or totality transcending and including each particular thing). The outlying relations are from one point of view causal relations to the several properties of the thing. Hence Reflection regards every somewhat as existing in another or *alterum*, and hence as self-other or other to itself, and hence as finite. (If the being of A is in B and B be regarded as the other of A, then the being of A is other to itself, i.e. it is sundered into essence or cause which lies in B, and into appearance or form which lies in A. The dependent or phenomenal being, or "finite" being as Spinoza called it, contains this contradiction of being other to itself; whence its eternal process of *change*; inasmuch as its tension from itself draws it toward itself in a perpetual process. The universal gravitation of matter is an instance of a process arising through this sundering from itself. Hence in the above propositions the activity of Reflection finds the simple cognition of sequence (or accidental relation) inadequate for the explanation of the determinations of the thing. It transcends the same by an act of gen-

eralization which identifies one of the terms of the sequence with its cause, and at the same time differentiates both cause and effect from other non-identical terms necessarily concomitant.

EDITOR.]

### *Castelar's Republican Movement in Europe.*

At intervals during the past year there have appeared in Harper's Magazine a series of extraordinary articles by the great Tribune of Spain, Emilio Castelar, written with all the brilliancy and eloquence that are so peculiarly his own, and yet so full of what is generally known as German metaphysics that the reader is puzzled what to admire most, the subject-matter or its setting. Though these articles are headed "*The Republican Movement in Europe*," they rather deserve the heading, *The Philosophical Movement in Europe*. Señor Castelar describes this movement from the Kantian epoch to recent times in the various forms it has assumed among the different races of Europe: the Slavonic, the Latin, and the Germanic. Though in these descriptions the political influence exercised by each philosophical system upon the various nations of Europe has been the chief theme as it were, the purely philosophical side has never been lost sight of, and is sometimes discussed with a knowledge and insight that show Señor Castelar to be something more than a general reader of the science.

We beg leave to call the attention of all readers to these most admirable papers. The articles on the Slavonic races are full of that unutterable pathos and sadness which seems to tinge everything that is Russian; and it is with a melancholy smile the reader follows Señor Castelar's brilliant description of the influence exercised by the systems of Schelling and Hegel upon the young poets and scholars of Russia in the Moscow university—upon Young Russia, as it is named, and no name can be more pathetic.

The papers on the Latin races interest chiefly from the intimate acquaintance Señor Castelar displays with all their chief modern leaders and the principles that severally guide them, though in the articles on the Slavonic races there are also touching personal memorials.

But probably the most interesting to our readers will be his articles on the Germanic races that began in the July number of Harper's Magazine for this year, and are to be continued through the August and September numbers. It is encouraging and refreshing to find such reading in a publication like Harper's, and to know that it is read in 135,000 copies by probably some 500,000 persons.

The characteristics given by Señor Castelar of German philosophy in general, and of German philosophers too by-the-by, as well as his exposition of the systems of Kant, Fichte and Jacobi, deserves the highest praise; and we once more commend the whole series of articles to the readers of this journal.

St. Louis. August, 1873.

A. E. KROEGER.

[Since the above was written, two other articles from the pen of Señor Castelar have appeared in Harper, continuing his discussion of the Republican movement in Europe. In the August number, Article I., on the Germanic Peoples, treated of Fichte; Article II., in September, treated of Hegel; Article III., in October, treats of Schopenhauer and Herbart.